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Abstract
Purpose –We consider what happened in the initial reconstruction interventions following the 6 April 2009
earthquake in L’Aquila (Italy). Using the disaster risk reduction and resilience paradigm, we discuss the
cognitive and interactional failures of top-down approaches, and we analyse the main constraints to enacting
inclusive social learning and socially-sustainable transformation and building back better more resilient
communities in post-disaster reconstruction.
Design/methodology/approach – Our evidence comes from participant observation, action anthropology
and analytic auto-ethnography conducted during the reconstruction phase following the L’Aquila earthquake.
Findings were triangulated with document analysis, media analysis and retrospective interviewing conducted
in 2013 and 2017.
Findings –The shift from civil defence to civil protection did not bring any advance in disaster management and
development practice in terms ofDRRand resilience. Themilitaristic command-and-control approach,which is still
in vogue among civil protection systems, means that local political leaders become the civil protection authorities
in a disaster area. As in the L’Aquila case, this exacerbates local social and environmental risks and impacts,
inhibits local communities from learning and restricts them from participating in post-disaster interventions.
Originality/value – Most previous commentary on disaster recovery and reconstruction following the
L’Aquila earthquake has focussed on the top-down approach carried out by the national government and the
Italian Department of Civil Protection (DCP). This paper is unique in that it sheds light on how the command-
and-control approach was also implemented by local authority figures and on how this undermined building
back better more resilient communities.
Keywords Disaster risk reduction, Resilience, Command and control, Reconstruction, Earthquakes, Disaster
management
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The reconstruction phase in the disaster management cycle includes the management of
and processes related to the restoration of damaged buildings and construction of
replacement permanent housing (i.e. resettlement) and the social dimensions of these
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In addition to local communities, there are many other actors, local and external, involved in
reconstruction, including disaster management agencies, governments at all levels,
housing organisations, building firms, NGOs, private investors, universities and research
foundations and local and national professionals. All disaster management interventions,
including reconstruction, have five components: (1) an institutional strategy; (2) financial
strategy; (3) community participation approach; (4) physical planning (e.g. disaster rubble
management and local infrastructure reconstruction) and (5) risk management (Jha et al.,
2010). Decisions made and actions carried out regarding these components will have
positive and negative impacts on local communities and will reduce or exacerbate
vulnerabilities and social risks (e.g. inequity, social exclusion and elite capture), as well as
mitigate or worsen the social impacts of disasters (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, 2020;
Finucane et al., 2020).
The housing sector tends to experience major losses from disasters, especially
earthquakes (Amin and Goldestein, 2008). Reconstruction is a key activity in any post-
disaster situation (UNDRO, 1982; Jha et al., 2010). Community marginalisation from
reconstruction exacerbates local vulnerabilities and associated disaster risks and impacts
(Sadiqi et al., 2017). Since the 1980s, various United Nations documents have promulgated a
DRR and resilience paradigm that should be the basis of disaster and development agencies
in all countries (UNDRO, 1982; INDNR, 1994; UNISDR, 2005, 2015). The DRR and resilience
paradigm advocates reducing vulnerabilities and risks, enacting genuine community
engagement and empowerment and building local community resilience at all phases of
disaster management and development (IFRC and RCS, 2004; UNISDR, 2007; Benson and
Twigg, 2007; UNISDR and UNDP, 2007; Jha et al., 2010).
Resilience has many definitions and a long history across several disciplines (Adger,
2000; Berkes et al., 2003; Folke, 2006; Norris et al., 2008; Folke et al., 2010; Davidson, 2010;
Berkes and Ross, 2013, 2016). Strengthening the resilience of communities before and after
disasters was first advocated by the United Nations in the Yokohama Strategy (IDNDR,
1994). The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 emphasised the need for proactive measures
and argued that the response, recovery and reconstruction phases are windows of
opportunity to build back better livelihoods and physical and socio-economic structures in
ways that will build community resilience and reduce vulnerability to future disaster risks
(UNISDR, 2005).
In a previous work (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2016a), we defined local community resilience
as the agency (i.e. a set of cognitive and interactional capacities and processes) that enables
members of local communities to collectively learn from crises, disasters and other unwanted
changes and positively transform towards reducing local vulnerabilities, social risks and
associated disaster risks and impacts, thus enhancing the well-being of all members of a
community, especially the most vulnerable. To build back better more resilient and
sustainable landscapes and communities, understanding, recognising, engaging and
empowering the capacities of local people to collectively learn and transform towards
reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing DRR and community well-being is crucial (Imperiale
and Vanclay, 2016b).
Too often, disaster management interventions become structural failures that ignore,
exclude or weaken community resilience through “counterproductive help”, i.e. increased
dependency on external support (Illich, 1976, 1978; Ellerman, 2006), thus failing to build
resilience at the cognitive (i.e. counterproductive learning) and interactional levels (i.e.
counterproductive transformation). We define counterproductive learning, in the context of
disasters, as failures at the cognitive level induced by counterproductive help that inhibits
people from learning from local vulnerabilities, the root causes of disasters and disaster risks
and impacts. Counterproductive learning worsens local social risks, including rent-seeking,




result in worsening local inequities, social exclusion and a lack of capacity, thereby
exacerbating local vulnerabilities and associated disaster risks and impacts. Unfortunately,
before and after disasters, business-as-usual and uncertainty about how resilience can be
strengthened at the local community level enable traditional top-down models of planning
and management to be perpetuated and international principles to be ignored (Imperiale and
Vanclay, 2019a, b, 2020).
Previously, we conceptualised the mechanism that states with centralised, top-down civil
protection systems enact in times of crises and disasters, thus creating counterproductive
learning and facilitating disaster capitalism (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020). In this paper,
using the DRR and resilience paradigm, we analyse the top-down approach to post-disaster
reconstruction thatwas applied by the national civil protection agency and the local authority
figures after the 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila, Italy. We reflect on the top-down
reconstruction interventions that were implemented, and how such an approach
represents a component of the mechanism that creates counterproductive learning and
facilitates disaster capitalism, thus failing to build back better resilient communities.
The 6 April 2009 earthquake, red zones and the crater
On 6 April 2009, a 6.3 Mw earthquake devastated the regional capital, L’Aquila and 56
surrounding municipalities. Some 309 persons were killed, 1,500 injured and 70,000 people
were rendered homeless in the affected area, which became known as “the crater”. Within
hours, a state of emergency was declared and remained in force for three years, an
extraordinarily long period (Venice Commission, 1995; Khakee, 2009). Exclusion areas (i.e. red
zones) were established to restrict local people from the severely-affected town centres across
the crater. To coordinate the emergency, the national Department of Civil Protection (DCP)
established a Directorate of Command and Control (DICOMAC). The powers of local
authority figures – including the President of the Abruzzo Region, the President of the
L’Aquila Province and the mayors of the local municipalities – were expanded, while local
councils were suspended. Providing that they deferred to the DCP, the local authority figures
were granted emergency powers and expected to implement key disaster management
activities, including safety measure implementation, disaster rubble management and
reconstruction interventions.
The recovery process has been severely criticised, including by a European Parliament
enquiry concerned about the misuse of the V493 million it provided (Søndergaard, 2013).
There was organised crime infiltration (Galullo, 2009; Postiglione, 2010; Libera, 2010;
Søndergaard, 2013; DNA, 2017; Bindi, 2018). Since the earthquake, many legal actions have
been taken relating to allegations of fraud, corruption, bribery, inadequate public
administration and Mafia infiltration, implicating national and local public officers and
building firms (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, b, 2020). Most academic research about the
recovery process has primarily focused on how the Italian government and the DCP carried
out disaster recovery. There has been little research on the actions local authority figures
took, the emergency powers they were given, how their actions were implemented or the
negative consequences created.
While the government was militarising the area and the DCP was managing the tent
camps, implementing temporary housing solutions and conducting the “habitability”
assessments (see below), the ordinance issued by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (OPCM
n.3753, 6 April 2009) entitled the Presidents of the Abruzzo Region and the L’Aquila province,
and the local mayors to, among other things: (1) establish technical teams to identify the
buildings that needed safety measures (i.e. shoring-up solutions and demolitions);
(2) implement safety measures; (3) manage disaster rubble and (4) design and implement






responsible for in the normal situation (e.g. the building of a bridge, the enhancement of local
roads and the railway, see Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020).
We consider how these actions were done and the consequences of this, and we discuss
how local and national authority figures failed to build back better more sustainable and
resilient communities. We specifically consider the extent to which the exclusion of local
communities was evident in how the top-down planning approach was implemented, and
how this led to counterproductive learning and to building a culture of disaster capitalism
rather than to community well-being and resilience. More than 10 years after the earthquake,
the red zones are still officially in force, andmany buildings remain crammedwith temporary
shoring-up solutions and are overgrown and deteriorating. There are also many empty
apartments now owned by the local municipalities because the original owners decided to
move away and surrendered ownership. This is an increasing burden on thesemunicipalities.
Nevertheless, some 10,000 people still live in temporary accommodation.
Methodology
The primary author is an Italian citizen who was a resident in the L’Aquila region for most of
his life. He was present in L’Aquila city on the night of the earthquake and lived in the
L’Aquila mountain province for the subsequent seven years. As a reflexive scholar and
practitioner, in the days after the earthquake, he began taking notes of his experiences. In his
role as a volunteer organiser of community arts events, he developed ideas and plans for
actions he could take for social reconstruction within the tent camps. To plan appropriate
artistic initiatives, he developed a way of monitoring social conditions in the tent camps. In
January 2010, he became involved in a participatory reconstruction project proposal, which
enabled him to undertake two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the L’Aquila region, during
which time he applied social impact assessment (Benson and Twigg, 2007; Imperiale and
Vanclay, 2016b) to enhance the social development outcomes of the project proposal with
which he was engaged.
This paper is part of a larger research project looking at the social dimensions of the
L’Aquila earthquake at each disaster management phase (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2016a, b;
2019a, b, 2020). The overall project used a wide range of methods, including: action
anthropology (Coghlan and Brydon-Miller, 2014); analytic auto-ethnography (Anderson,
2006); participant observation; fieldwork discussions; fieldnotes; blogging; surveys;
document analysis; media analysis; a total of 37 in-depth interviews with key informants
and over 250 interviews with people in local communities. The data used in this paper
primarily come from the participant observation, action anthropology and analytic auto-
ethnography conducted during the reconstruction phase, and from systematic document
analysis, media analysis and retrospective in-depth interviewing.
This paper primarily draws on 20 in-depth interviews that specifically focussed on the
local community experience of demolition, top-down disaster management and the
consequences of this on local governance and community well-being, five done in 2013
and 15 done in 2017. The 2013 interviews were with three local homeowners whose houses
had been demolished, and two people who closely knew people whose houses had been
demolished. The 2017 interviewswerewith key local people whowere ideal key informants in
that they were knowledgeable about what happened in the L’Aquila region after the
earthquake andwerewilling to speak frankly. Theywere identified by using the lead author’s
networks and by approaching people mentioned in the media.
The interviews were recorded. Informed consent and general principles of ethical social
research were observed (Vanclay et al., 2013). All interviews were done in Italian. For this
paper, extracts from some interviews were translated into English by the primary author,
with adaptation by the native English speaking co-author. In our translations, we reflected




translation. A draft version of the paper was given to the quoted interviewees for their
validation and approval.
The top-down approach to how habitability was assessed and how houses were
grouped
As a result of the earthquake, over 34,000 buildings were damaged to some extent, while some
37,000 buildings had no damage of consequence (DCP, 2018). Less than a month after the
earthquake, technical surveys were conducted to evaluate the agibilita (habitability/liveability)
of damaged buildings all over the crater. The criteria for assessing habitability, which were
established as a consequence of previous earthquakes, were stated in Ordinance n.3753 of 6
April 2009. Thousands of professionals who came from all over Italy registered as DCP
volunteers and together with local professionals were organised and coordinated by the DCP
into teams to assess habitability using a DCP habitability form. By October 2009, 73,521
buildings across the crater had been assessed (DCP, 2018), with around 37,000 (52%) classified
“A” (habitable); 11,000 (16%) classified either “B” or “C” (temporarily uninhabitable); while
23,000 (32%) were classified “E” (uninhabitable) or “F” (adjacent to an E building). Some 1,800
heritage buildings (including 1,045 churches) were assessed separately.
In other post-earthquake interventions in Italy (even those with more damage than
L’Aquila), public sector technicians were recruited, first those whowere local, then from other
regions. Only if more assessors would be needed, would private sector professionals be
engaged, and then they were only allowed to support public officers in the assessments. In
those cases, the professionals were technically subpoenaed to serve the state and were
obligated to observe public duties and procedures. In the L’Aquila situation, however, the
DCP made an agreement with the national professional associations so that thousands of
freelance professionals could come to the L’Aquila crater. This created problems in relation to
the many technicians who did not have the necessary technical competence. An engineer,
who had a key role in the design of the habitability assessments, told us:
These professionals were not adequately prepared at all. The technical sheets they had to complete
were not overly complicated, but usually required 2–3 days training. In the L’Aquila case, however,
freelance professionals were only given instruction for a couple of hours at the DICOMAC offices and
then sent to do inspections, often creating confusion. Fortunately, there were also fire service staff
who had completed ad-hoc training programs on the methodology of damage assessment and the
criteria for compliance with safety standards, and some technicians coming from other regions had
completed ad hoc training programs and had obtained the professional qualification of
“habitabilitators”, but the majority were absolutely not prepared and received only poor training.
The inspections led to initial identification of groupings of houses for planning future
reconstruction. These groupings were determined by an automated system the DCP applied
to cadastral data. As the engineer explained:
The identification of the groupings of houses . . . was made by the DCP in an automated way. The
DCP had a set of maps based on cadastral data through which it automatically design groups of
houses for proposed reconstruction interventions. However, reality is totally different to cadastral
data, which, for example, is not always updated.
Subsequently, private technicians were not required to follow the groupings of houses
identified by the DCP. In May 2010, the L’Aquila municipality invited local technicians to
submit nominations for new groupings. These nominations had to outline how conducive they
were to future reconstruction projects. Thousands of nominations (sometimes overlapping)
were submitted and were considered by the municipality. However, there was no requirement
for these nominations to have the consent of local homeowners. The overlapping proposals led
to conflict between project developers and to confusion among residents. In October 2010, pre-






proposals. Initially, these proposalswere developed only by considering technicalmatters, such
as the structural integrity of the grouping and feasibility of the proposed interventions, without
any consent or consultation with the residents.
A crucial issue in post-disaster reconstruction is social and physical proximity. People in
different apartments within the same building, or people living in houses that abut others, are
examples of proximity. After a disaster, proximitymakes it technically impossible for a single
homeowner to initiate reconstruction of their house without coordinating with their
neighbours. Therefore, in post-disaster reconstruction, a crucial task is not only the
identification and establishment of groupings of houses functional to future reconstruction,
but, more importantly, the groupings of inhabitants who live in the same neighbourhood
(owners’ consortia). They need to agree, come to a common vision and undertake collective
action for reconstruction.
Governments typically provide state contributions to owners’ consortia (not to individual
homeowners). Where these consortia do not already exist, states should encourage the
establishment of consortia, especially immediately after disasters to enable collective action
and the rebuilding of neighbourhood relationships and a sense of community as quickly as
possible. In L’Aquila, however, despite complex building structures in which many houses
were interlocked, there was no history of owners’ consortia. Underlying interests, the top-
down procedures implemented and the command-and-control approachmeant that there was
an institutional ignorance and denial about the desirability of community engagement in the
reconstruction process. Nevertheless, continued pressure from inhabitants eventually led to a
mayoral ordinance in April 2011, which clarified the procedures by which local homeowners
could establish consortia to obtain the state contribution and decide on the planned
interventions in relation to their homes and common spaces. The same ordinance also
clarified the rights of homeowners. However, in many villages, the formal legal process that
ensured respect of local inhabitants’ right to participate took many more years before being
implemented.
When local inhabitants were finally officially able to decide on the reconstruction of their
own homes (after April 2011), they often found it was too late – private building firms (and
their technicians) had already been directly appointed by localmunicipalities and had already
undertaken activities on their properties, including: shoring-up solutions, demolitions,
identification of groupings of houses for reconstruction and the design of preliminary
reconstruction project proposals. The initial reconstruction interventions were techno-driven
and business-led, with local people being kept in the dark. There was no procedure to ensure
equity and inclusion, which allowed the process to be dominated by people seeking individual
gain. As the engineer explained:
[In most cases] the inhabitants delegated everything to the convenors of the owners’ consortia, who
very often were in cahoots with the technicians and building firms. Thus, the convenors could do
whatever they wanted. There were individuals who were the convenor of more than 20 consortia
related to the reconstruction of houses. In some rural villages, there was one person who was the
convenor of all groups of houses in the village. The local municipality’smistake was that they did not
provide proper information to the broader public, and only interacted with local technicians.
Top-down shoring-up and demolition
Surprisingly, the process of safety measure implementation (i.e. shoring-up solutions and
demolitions) was completely separated from the habitability assessments and the
identification of groupings of houses for future reconstruction. As the engineer explained:
Safetymeasure implementation, in theory, should have been designed and implemented according to




[for rapid habitability assessment], there was much data that could have been immediately used for
this purpose. But they didn’t even read it! In the habitability form, there was everything: for example,
if a building resulted in B “partially habitable”, it was also expected that “suggested safety
interventions to be implemented” also be completed by the technician. Furthermore, there were some
pre-defined standard intervention options, which you simply had to put a cross against. However,
this information was not normally used.
Without following the DCP’s habitability assessment but only using information coming
from inspections that they conducted separately, given the emergency powers they had been
granted, the local mayors and their technical managers could directly appoint building firms
to demolish buildings or implement shoring-up solutions (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020).
Safety measure implementation and disaster rubble management activities took place over
many years, but were heavily concentrated in the first fewmonths. During the three years the
state of emergency was in force, these interventions were conducted using no-bid contracts
and with derogation of the normal procedures of public procurement, anti-mafia controls,
environmental and health safeguard procedures and in the total absence of any public
oversight. All this resulted in a lack of strategic programming and no consideration of the
longer-term sustainability of the activities conducted, facilitating elite capture, rent-seeking,
disaster capitalism, Mafia infiltration and corruption at local and national levels, creating
further environmental and social impacts (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020).
Demolitions were carried out without engaging local homeowners, not with any care
regardingmaterials that could have been reused (e.g. historic stones and planks) or regarding
the possessions of inhabitants. This is a breach of decency and dignity and is a violation of the
human right to property (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, 2020). In one interview, similar to
stories that told bymany people, a local homeowner reported that their housewas demolished
in 2012 without their knowledge or consent, despite being three years after the earthquake:
They did not let me know anything, and only by chance a villager told me that they had demolished
my house. I was not called, not even to assist: nothing. That was not fair, was it?What do you think?
What if I needed to collect things from home? I did not know anything! I did not see anything. I could
not see any draft or project design about the pre-demolition state ofmy home, or about the demolition
procedure they carried out, nothing!
In less than 6 months after the earthquake, the whole red zone of L’Aquila city was “put into
safety” (Imperiale andVanclay, 2020). The red zonewas carved-up into districts and assigned
to various influential local and national building firms. De Berardinis and De Gregorio (2014)
claimed that in L’Aquila city alone, approximately 40,000 cubic metres of wood, 400,000
polyester strap ratchet clamps, 10,000 tonnes of steel, and 2 million segments of tubular
scaffoldingwere used in the temporary safetymeasures. However, far from putting buildings
into safety or being conducive to the effective physical reconstruction of damaged buildings,
most safety measures implemented were disproportionate and damaging to property. The
attention given to safety measure implementation caused considerable delay to the start of
reconstruction, further marginalising and alienating local communities from their properties
and their right to decide about their future. It prolonged the collective sense of precariousness,
temporariness, uncertainty and lack of a shared vision for the future reconstruction of their
city and landscape.
Concerning the enforced temporariness of these safety measures, the engineer (who was
also an inhabitant of a mountain village in the crater) stated:
For a clever professional, most safety measures implemented could have immediately been
provisional work for the reconstruction of the damaged buildings. For each damaged building, one
could have implemented permanent safety measures which would have maintained the building in a
safe condition, and enhanced the outcomes from the restoration process. Think about the amount of






the building firm that was appointed by the L’Aquila Municipality to implement safety measures on
my building . . .With him, we designed a project in which 60–70% of the safety materials could be
used permanently and left inside the building, thus improving the overall outcomes from restoration.
The cost of this material could have been deducted from the total cost of the reconstruction of the
building. Thus, just imagine what a saving would have been achieved! However, the technical
commission in charge of approving the design of safety measure implementation rejected our
proposal because the safety measures were not allowed to be permanent, but had to be temporary!
This was crazy! Imagine, on the contrary, how much money could have been saved if there was a
different way of thinking about this!
Although safetymeasure implementation did not function as provisional works for the future
reconstruction of damaged buildings, for the building firms they acted as a sort of pre-
emptive option over buildings in relation to likely future reconstruction work. Removing the
safety measures was complicated, and many homeowners considered it would be quicker to
appoint the same building firm that installed the safety measures to do the reconstruction
work. Furthermore, by having already worked on their buildings, the building firms could
easily contact the inhabitants and they used these arguments as leverage to get appointed to
do the permanent reconstruction. As the engineer confirmed:
In most cases, the private building firms appointed for the implementation of the shoring-up
solutions were the same as those that became appointed for the reconstruction project andworks. . . .
In my case, however, I kicked the private building firm that implemented the shoring-up solution out
frommyhouse after he completed the preliminarywork. I told him: I even know you, sorry, but I will let
another building firm, one I want, to do the work on the proper reconstruction design and
implementation of my house and the group of houses in which my house has been included.
Safety measure implementation was not accompanied by any mid or long-term planning, or
by any consideration of the social-ecological lifecycle of the materials being used, nor of how
these interventions could have contributed to the physical reconstruction of the buildings (De
Berardinis and De Gregorio, 2014). At the time of writing (early 2020), effective and
sustainable procedures for dismantling, transporting, storing and re-using (or disposing) the
safety measures are still unclear. The process of dismantling them and finding adequate
arrangements for their storage and reuse is complicated. As the engineer explained:
When the proper physical reconstruction of the buildings began, because of their temporariness,
the safety bracings had to be removed . . .We proposed that the safety bracings should have been
left in the hands of the building firm . . . as removing them is not an easy task, especially after 7–8
years. Leaving these materials to the building firms, . . . so they could reuse them or sell them back
to the market, would have . . . [reduced] further bureaucracy. But, no, the local municipality
invented a system in which someone had to remove them, weigh them, and deliver them to the
municipality. I told themunicipality that, if we do this, we risk sendingmany people to jail because,
if one is meticulous in this procedure, it would reveal that, based on the original cost estimate, the
building firm had claimed 100 joints at V28 each – when actually they cost V6, and that this was
another big source of profit. Then, when one dismantles them, and instead of 100, they find only 60
joints, what should one do? Should one have to denounce the building firm? Should one have to
send the building firm and the local municipality [who approved this implementation] to jail?
[laughs] It is pointless to deal with this shit. Let’s do a rough compensation and that’s it. But
instead, one has to dismantle them, weigh them, and bring them to the municipality. However, the
municipality does not have sufficient space to store these things, so the building firms have to bear
a double cost, also the cost of renting space to store them until the municipality can take them back.
. . . The incredible cost of the temporary measures implemented this way was thus doubled: the
state first paid to implement them; now they are paying to remove them. Meanwhile, the delay to
physical reconstruction is unbearable.
The total cost of the shoring-up solutions and demolitions implemented by private firms




The costs were managed by the directors of the municipal technical offices and local mayors,
using the Civil Protection Fund. There was no public disclosure or monitoring of these
actions, which were covered by state secrecy provisions. The local municipalities were not
required to produce any official financial statement (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020).
The safety measures delayed the proper reconstruction process and prolonged the
collective sense of precariousness, temporariness, uncertainty and lack of a shared vision for
the future reconstruction. After 10 years, all town centres of the crater still have red zones, to
which access is still formally restricted. An inhabitant of a mountain village (interviewed in
2017) told us:
Safety measures perhaps should be implemented immediately after the disaster, but they should not
remain after almost ten years . . . My village is a red zone, substantially it is still a red zone! . . . I
remember, after 5 years, I was going to my house, which is in the red zone, and some personnel in
uniform, probably from the DCP, who just happened to be there, stoppedme, looked atme and asked:
Where are you going? I know that these people were acting in a good faith, but you come and say to
me “Where are you going?” To me? In my village? . . . thus, “Please, get out of my place!” Can’t I go to
my home, or do I have to call the Fire Service to go to my home? After 5 years! Really? I might accept
this after one or twomonths, or even after six months! But you, after 5 years, come to me and ask me,
Where are you going?. I asked them “where they were going” [laughs] and “where did they come
from” [laughs]! . . .Now, after almost 10 years, access to our village is still formally denied and this is
totally unacceptable.
Top-down reconstruction policy, design and implementation
In L’Aquila, the habitability assessments were used for different purposes than in previous
post-disaster situations, such as the Umbria (1997) and Molise (2002) earthquakes. Rather
than providing general information that could have supported a coherent assessment of the
public need for temporary housing, the amount of public money needed for reconstruction, or
the design of a coherent reconstruction policy, the primary purpose of the quick habitability
assessment was to support requests by individuals for a state contribution to reconstruction
of their dwelling.
One issue of concern was that the government ordinances that enabled the state
contribution (OPCM n.3779 on 6 June 2009 and OPCM n.3790 on 7 July 2009) were issued
while the habitability assessments were still being conducted. This meant that the
technicians doing the assessments realised that there would be little scrutiny of their
assessments, and that they were in a prime position to exaggerate the damage, inflate the
estimated cost of reconstruction and subsequently benefit from future reconstruction works.
The engineer we interviewed stated:
Issuing these ordinances while the habitability assessment was still going on allowed assessments to
be distorted by private interests, so that many technicians made the habitability results worse than
they were in reality. Another contradiction created was that the habitability assessment results say
little about the damage to each building produced by the earthquake itself that the state contribution
was intended to address. Many buildings could get a habitability assessment of “E”, not “habitable”,
yet have little damage that was directly due to the earthquake. This resulted from the fact that a non-
habitability rating “E” could be given by noting that the building was not accessible because there
were unstable buildings nearby, or there were unstable buildings threatening it. Even if there was
only a precarious chimney that threatened the main entrance of a building, this would render the
building as “not habitable” [even if it was in otherwise fine condition]. In one study . . . it was
determined that across thewhole crater, 10%of buildings declared E actually had little damage or no
damage at all. Even if they had only little damage, they were considered the same as “not habitable”






The engineer further explained:
In the case of the Umbria andMarche earthquakes in 1997 and in the case of theMolise earthquake in
2002, the state contribution [to owners] was strictly tied to the assessment of damage created by the
earthquake, the dimensions of the damaged building and to its structural vulnerability, up to a
defined maximum amount that could be claimed from the state. However, in the case of L’Aquila,
before the introduction of a new survey form [scheda parametrica], which was issued in 2012, there
was no established maximum that could be requested. The state contribution was not tied to any
damage assessment but could only be approved according to the habitability results and the amount
of money that was estimated by the private reconstruction project. Only when the new survey sheet
was introduced in 2012 could we require that the state contribution had to be directly proportional to
the damages created by the earthquake and to the intrinsic vulnerability of the building itself, up to
an established maximum.
Before the scheda parametrica was introduced, there was massive proliferation of
reconstruction projects and much inflation in the proposed cost of projects, many of which
were approved and funded by the state. As the engineer explained (slightly modified for
clarity):
Another nonsense was that, before the introduction of the scheda parametrica, for a building with 10
apartments you had to present 11 projects: 1 project for each apartment and 1 project for the common
parts. This was an absurd thing, technically speaking. It brought . . . a proliferation in the number of
assignments for reconstruction projects. The splintering of the whole building into different sub-
projects for each single apartment within the same building increased the cost of the projects. This
was especially because the discretionary overhead (mark-up) of a project is inversely proportional to
the cost of the whole project: to simplify with an example, for a reconstruction of 50,000 euros, the
mark-up is 15%, whereas on a reconstruction of 300,000 euros, the mark-up is 7%. [so if you chop a
project up into little pieces, the total cost is increased, and the more money the technicians get].
Another controversial issue is related to how public funds for heritage reconstruction were
managed. A separate procedure to access the state contribution for the reconstruction of
buildings designated as heritage was established, with approval of requests being conducted
by the local heritage authority. This was quicker than the normal procedure. The owners of
heritage buildings also benefitted from an additional allowance equivalent to the
reconstruction cost estimate made by the reconstruction project (in other words, they
received double the amount) (OPCMn.3917, 2010, Article 21, subpara.2). The rationale for this
double payment ostensibly was that heritage building owners were expected to use the extra
funds to conduct additional works to ensure greater seismic resistance in the future. However,
there was no requirement that the heritage status had to have been determined prior to the
earthquake, and consequently there was distortion in claims under this mechanism. After
the earthquake, some people were able to get their building declared heritage so they
could benefit from the quicker process and extra payment. As our engineer informant
explained:
Buildings considered heritage could get access to an amount of money that was double what
ordinary buildings could get. This was totally wrong, simply because of the fact that many buildings
could be considered heritage only because a small portion of them was old, or because they had one
window frame from the 14th century. However, no matter how little the detail was, . . . the building
would be considered heritage in its totality, and could get double the State contribution for
reconstruction. Only after the scheda parametrica was implemented could we introduce a criterion
that the State contribution had to be directly proportional to the heritage elements.
The failure to build back better more resilient communities
To build back better more resilient communities, any planned intervention should engage




resilience that enhances inclusive social learning and socially-sustainable transformation. To
develop such a community culture, knowledge about community well-being, vulnerabilities,
risks and impacts must be co-produced with affected local communities and be
transformative (Jerneck et al., 2011; Imperiale and Vanclay, 2016b). Advances in disaster
studies emphasise the need for social impact assessment to accompany disaster management
and development interventions, including post-disaster reconstruction (Benson and Twigg,
2007; Jha et al., 2010; UNISDR, 2015; Finucane et al., 2020). Recent application of social impact
assessment has expanded from its traditional domain to now co-producing transformative
knowledge with affected local communities and to influencing the conception, decision,
design and implementation of planned interventions to enhance social learning and
transformation, DRR and community well-being and resilience (Imperiale and Vanclay,
2016b; Kruger et al., 2020; Finucane et al., 2020; Vanclay, 2020).
Such co-produced and transformative knowledge should be embodied in each component
of planned interventions (i.e. the institutional strategy, financial strategy, physical planning
and community participation) andmust encourage empathy, caring, social responsibility and
strengthen cooperation and mutual aid. These positive feelings, attitudes and behaviours
enable local people to: collectively understand disaster risks and impacts; recognise local
vulnerabilities to reduce and identify the vulnerable members of their community to support;
and to enhance local knowledge, capacities and assets to co-design and co-develop, together
with the disaster management and development agencies, mitigation strategies to enhance
DRR, community well-being and resilience. This co-produced and transformative approach
enhances sense of risk, sense of place and sense of community, all of which are crucial for
building community resilience, and such an approach should inform each of the five
components orienting planned intervention from before conception to after completion
(Berkes and Ross, 2013, 2016; Imperiale and Vanclay, 2016a, b).
As revealed here and in our previous work (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020), however, the
institutional strategy enacted by the Italian state, at least up to 2012, was to provide
emergency powers which enabled interventions to be carried out with derogation of the
public procurement, anti-mafia controls, public health and environmental safeguard
procedures normally required (e.g. environmental impact assessment, risk monitoring,
environmental safety measures, protection of groundwater at waste disposal sites, etc.)
(Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020). The institutional strategy was to regulate the reconstruction
process and the state contribution via a large number of ordinances and decrees. Changes in
these arrangements created differences in treatment, confusion and alienation ofmost people,
especially the most vulnerable. Derogations transformed rubble, safety measure
implementation, demolitions and reconstruction interventions into avenues for elite
capture, corruption, disaster capitalism and organised crime infiltration (Postiglione, 2010;
DNA, 2017; Bindi, 2018; Imperiale and Vanclay, 2020).
During the 3 years of the state of emergency, the DCP and local authority figures adopted a
top-down, command-and-control approach to allocate financial resources for post-disaster
interventions. Funding was made available by the state through the Civil Protection Fund
and other financial arrangements. Under the emergency powers and covered by state secrecy
provisions, the national and local authority figures had access to unlimited funds. Local
authority figures used no-bid contracts to appoint building firms to demolish buildings,
design and implement shoring-up solutions, manage disaster rubble, implement
infrastructure and reconstruct public buildings, including schools, churches and other
heritage properties. All activities lacked transparency and accountability, something that
undermined inclusive and participatory social learning and transformation. The state secrecy
provisions, lack of disclosure and derogations associated with the state of emergency, served
to hide dubious arrangements, disguise fraud and corruption and facilitated disaster






exacerbating vulnerability and associated disaster risks and impacts (Imperiale andVanclay,
2019a, 2020).
The procedures used by the state did not require any engagement of local communities or
their elected councils during conception, decision, design or implementation of post-disaster
interventions. The command-and-control approach meant that local political leaders gained
autocratic powers, while the local elected councils and local communities were excluded from
decision making. No participatory community needs assessment was done. Local people’s
ideas about possible alternative solutions were not taken into consideration. Similarly, in the
actions implemented by local authority figures, only the Directors of the technical offices,
DICOMAC and state-owned companies were consulted, at the expense of the local democratic
governance of the crater, further marginalising local communities from the reconstruction of
their own future (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, 2020).
Before and after the L’Aquila earthquake, the mitigation of vulnerabilities, risks and
impacts was considered to be only the responsibility of national and local authority figures.
The knowledge that used to inform initial reconstruction interventionswas deemed to be only
techno-scientific knowledge relating to the vulnerabilities of the built environment, rather
than being co-produced, transformative and related to the multiple dimensions of community
well-being and resilience. There was no requirement to consider how to preserve and
strengthen neighbourhood relationships, or reduce the environmental, social and human
rights risks and impacts that disaster management and development interventions created at
the local level. Nor was there any requirement to ensure the mid to long-term sustainability of
these interventions, or prevent exacerbation of local social risks, vulnerabilities and the root
causes of disaster.
The only social risks considered were looting and other behaviours considered deviant by
the authorities (e.g. anxiety, alarmism and unsafe actions), so that, instead of being amatter of
community well-being and resilience, risk management became a matter of public control,
which, before disasters led to police action, and after disasters led to militarisation of the
affected area (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, b, 2020). All this further exacerbated the
exclusion andmarginalisation of local inhabitants from the reconstruction of their homes and
neighbourhoods. There was nothing in the system to assess and avoid the risks of rent-
seeking, elite capture, weak local governance, disaster capitalism or organised crime
infiltration (Imperiale and Vanclay, 2019a, 2020).
Conclusion
The L’Aquila disaster is not just an Italian story of corruption and organised crime
infiltration, but it revealsmuchmore.Within local communities, there can be resilience aswell
as counter-productive actions, such as elite capture, rent-seeking, infiltration of organised
crime, disaster capitalism and corruption. The way disaster management and development
interventions are conceived, decided, designed and implemented can facilitate both negative
and positive trends in local communities. Beyond being the result of endemic vulnerabilities
and social risks, disasters are also the product of the top-down planning approach, which
produces structural failures at all levels of society, including counterproductive learning and
counterproductive transformation.
Consistent with the paradigm shift around the world, from a war approach to considering
disasters in the context of socially-produced vulnerability (i.e. the DRR and resilience
paradigm), there has been a change from civil defence to civil protection (Alexander, 2002).
Unfortunately, as is evident from our research, this change has not been accompanied by any
change in the traditional military-type, top-down, command-and-control approach, or in the





Weargue that, in order to avoid such structural failures, the switch from thewar approach
to considering disasters in the context of socially-produced phenomena requires much more
than switching from civil defence to civil protection systems. To build back better resilient
communities, the mechanism enacted by states that adopt centralised civil protection
systems must be abolished. A crucial shift in disaster management and development
thinking and practice from protecting vulnerable, affected communities to empowering their
capacities to learn and transform, and from top-down, centralised civil protection systems to
decentralised, socially-sustainable community empowerment systems, is needed. Such
decentralised community empowerment systems must orient each of the five components of
disaster management and development interventions and enable inclusive social learning
and socially-sustainable transformation towards reducing local vulnerabilities, risks and
impacts and the root causes of disasters, enhancing DRR and resilience at all levels of society.
These decentralised, socially-sustainable community empowerment systems should put at
the core of any planned intervention community health and well-being and should contribute
to building a community culture of resilience, rather than of disaster capitalism. Such a shift
would help external actors and local communities turn affected landscapes into landscapes of
affect, rather than carcasses to exploit.
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